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1. Introduction 
In 2014 the European Council confirmed the EU’s 2030 targets for tackling climate change as 
a reduction of at least 40% against 1990 greenhouse gas emissions and increasing the share of 
energy from renewable sources to 27%. It is currently putting in place the legislation to 
deliver this.  
Given the difficulty of decarbonizing transport and heating, the electricity sector will 
continue to bear a significant burden arising from economy-wide decarbonization. Achieving 
this will require high shares of renewable energy supply (RES) in the electricity system, in 
light of the limited opportunities for expansion of hydro power and widespread resistance to 
nuclear power. Fortunately, rapid technological progress in wind and solar energy, combined 
with increased use of interconnection, existing hydro resources, new battery technologies and 
an increased role for the demand side (facilitated by smart meters) suggests that a high-RES 
electricity system is not only a necessary outcome of the 2030 policy targets but also a 
realistic future scenario. 
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To date, Europe has made remarkable progress in creating liberalized and competitive 
wholesale markets for trading electricity within and across national boundaries. The 
liberalization process, beginning in the 1990s, was accompanied by large-scale private 
investment in gas-fired power generation, which cut costs, reduced CO2 emissions and 
improved environmental quality. The creation of competitive wholesale markets with hourly 
or half-hourly varying prices was the central mechanism for matching supply and demand, 
and until the mid-2000s in some countries also for directing generation investment.  
The advent of intermittent renewables with high upfront capital costs but very low 
short-run running costs has led to a reduced role for the market in guiding investment. 
Governments now dominate by setting the subsidy regimes and capacity mechanisms that 
determine new generation investment.
2
 The share of renewables in EU-28 electricity 
production has increased remarkably over the last decade to reach 28% in 2015, driven by 
generous subsidies and priority dispatch connection terms. However, raising the renewables 
share to 50%+ by 2030 will be challenging without substantial modifications to the current 
“1st generation” market design. 
In this paper, we review the evolution of liberalized electricity markets and EU 
renewables and climate policy to date. We note the unintended problems which have arisen 
under the current market design and existing RES subsidy schemes. We then outline key 
elements of a “2nd generation” high-RES market design, which provides better price signals, 
better incentives for RES investment and operation, and greater system flexibility. 
We begin by advancing six principles of good electricity market design. These 
include: correcting as directly as possible the market failures in current market designs; 
allowing for cross-country variation in market design; using price signals and network tariffs 
to reflect the value of all electricity services; collecting network fixed costs in as efficient and 
equitable a way as possible; de-risking low-carbon investment; and retaining the flexibility to 
respond to new information on the attractiveness of different low-carbon technologies. We 
then provide a more detailed analysis of the key elements of a new market design and present 
a number of policy recommendations. 
We find that there are still substantial short-term benefits of further European cross-
border market integration (equal to around 2-3% of overall generation costs) and significant 
potential value in increased interconnection. Interconnectors exploit differences in wind and 
sun conditions across regions and so reduce the supply variability due to intermittency; 
higher RES penetration further raises the value of market integration. It should be a policy 
priority to ensure proper remuneration of the services provided by interconnectors so as to 
incentivize efficient private investment, including for more connection to markets with large 
hydro reserves such as Norway. 
Next, we discuss the challenges around the widespread uptake of electrical energy 
storage. We observe that the potential of electric storage, including from electric vehicles 
(EVs), remains tiny compared to existing pumped and hydro storage. Battery storage looks 
likely to play two main future roles: deferring upgrades in transmission and distribution 
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systems by shaving peak use, and improving the management of power flows on the 
electricity network by varying the charging rates of EVs. The surrounding incentives and 
business models that will allow batteries to capture this value still need to be clarified. 
We then examine possible improvements to the design of renewable support 
mechanisms, which yield better signals around where to locate renewables across Europe. We 
suggest a move from current output-based (per MWh) feed-in-tariffs to support more based 
on capacity, for which procurement prices are determined by auctions. As the system 
becomes more capital-intensive (rather than fuel-intensive), such competitive RES auctions 
can reduce current market distortions and help further bring down the cost of capital. 
We identify issues arising from the current pricing of transmission and distribution 
services. We suggest that network charges for distributed generation (DG), such as rooftop 
solar PV, need to be made more efficient. Current charging mechanisms have led to 
distortions and wealth transfers from poorer to richer households—and these are rising in 
magnitude and need to be considered alongside other policy objectives. We recommend that 
the apportionment of charges between fixed, off-peak and peak use of system charges needs 
to be changed to be more cost-reflective. 
We then turn to improvements to the design of power and ancillary service markets. A 
system dominated by intermittent renewables enhances the need for more granular pricing of 
electricity over space and time. The scope for nodal pricing of electricity has increased in 
tandem, given recent improvements in computing power and smart metering. A move 
towards more granular electricity prices will help improve location decisions for generation 
investment, and enhance the value of greater system decentralization. 
Finally, we discuss risk management and long-term contracting in a high-RES system. 
We suggest less reliance on politically-backed long-term indexed price contracts that have 
recently been used to support renewables and nuclear investment. The preferred design of 
capacity auctions should employ “reliability options” because these help retain efficient spot 
prices. Policy should support the deepening of markets for forward contracts and employ 
long-term procurements contracts only where necessary to reduce risk and the cost of capital.  
While our arguments are applicable across different European countries, many of our 
specific examples are drawn from the Germany, Italy, Spain and the UK. We touch on other 
elements of market design only as by-products of this analysis, including demand-side 
response, related issues arising for retail electricity markets, and optimal support mechanisms 
for low-carbon RD&D. 
 The paper proceeds as follows. Section 2 reviews the economics of liberalized 
electricity markets and the EU’s renewables and climate policies.3 Section 3 gives an 
overview of the market impacts—good and bad—which renewables have had to date. Section 
4 sets out principles for electricity market design in a high-RES world. Section 5 presents our 
analysis and recommendations for (i) interconnectors and market integration, (ii) electric 
energy storage, (iii) RES support mechanisms, (iv) distributed generation, (v) short-term 
pricing as well as (vi) long-term contracting and risk management. Section 6 offers broader 
concluding remarks on policy design for a high-RES future. 
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2. Liberalized electricity markets and EU renewables policy 
2.1. Liberalized electricity markets and market failures 
Though often conceived as a single homogenous product, electricity in fact involves a range 
of services so its wholesale value is made up of the energy value (kWh), the value of 
reliability (i.e., the ability to meet demand) provided by capacity (kW), and quality of service 
at a particular location, which is provided by a range of ancillary services (voltage stability, 
frequency, reactive power, etc.). 
 The key physical challenge is that supply must equal demand at all nodes of the 
system in real time, without resort to stockholding. On the supply side, renewables such as 
wind and solar PV come with smaller unit sizes but proportionally larger capital costs than 
traditional generation assets such as coal and gas; they also add the key challenges of dealing 
with intermittency and non-responsiveness to system condition (O’Sullivan et al., 2014). 
Electricity demand is volatile but also largely unresponsive to prices in the short run since 
most consumers do not see the costs of their electricity in anything close to real time. 
Perhaps the most important market failure lies in environmental externalities, notably 
air pollution and carbon emissions (Borenstein, 2012). The deployment of renewables comes 
with substantial learning benefits (declining unit cost as the installed base grows) that spill 
over to other market participants. Without proper support, learning and R&D in such new 
technologies may therefore be insufficient from a social viewpoint (Jaffe et al., 2005). 
Legislative packages since 1996 have opened the sector to vertical unbundling and 
competition. In liberalized markets, large players in the wholesale market may be able to 
exercise market power to drive up prices—especially when capacity is tight (Newbery, 1995). 
This is one motivation behind wholesale price caps, which limit market power in the short 
run. However, they in turn lead to the problem of “missing money” (Joskow, 2008): prices do 
not fully reflect scarcity in tight market conditions, reducing profitability and capacity 
investment over the longer haul. Similarly, the presence of “missing markets”, notably 
forward prices over longer horizons for all products (capacity, energy and quality of service) 
impedes efficient risk management.
4
 
This wide range of market and policy failures means that electricity cannot easily 
“self-organize” in the way that many other industries do (see, e.g., Kiesling, 2009). At a 
minimum, policymakers need to create an appropriate framework in which the private sector 
can deliver on climate targets at acceptable costs while still supplying reliable power over the 
short and long term. 
 
2.2. EU climate and renewables policy 
EU renewables policy is guided by three main objectives: (i) to secure energy supplies that 
ensure reliable provision; (ii) to create a competitive environment for energy providers to 
deliver affordable energy prices; and (iii) to support sustainability by lowering greenhouse 
gas emissions, pollution and fossil fuel dependence (European Commission, 2016).  
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The 2009 RES Directive (2009/28/EC) put forward a legally binding target for 
renewable energy sources to cover 20% of total EU energy consumption by 2020.
5
 For many 
countries, electricity is likely to be the leading sector so the national RES targets imply 
significantly higher shares of renewable electricity. In the UK, for example, a 15% overall 
RES target might require a RES electricity (RES-E) share of 30-40%. 
The importance of deep decarbonization of the electricity sector arises because of the 
difficulties in decarbonizing transport and heating—which are shared across much of Europe. 
Coupled with the limited scope for nuclear new build up to 2030, this suggests that high 
shares of renewables in the electricity system by 2030 are going to be critical for achieving 
climate targets. Based on a recent EU-28 study (European Commission, 2016b), the 
renewable electricity share will rise from 28% to 43% under current policies—but the 2030 
climate target of a 40% GHG reduction nonetheless is missed. (Currently policies achieve a 
35% emissions cut on 1990 levels; put differently, they fall around 290m tons short of the 
2030 target, which would require an additional 14% of current fossil-fuel produced electricity 
to become zero carbon). This suggests that 55%+ RES-E is likely to be necessary to hit the 
target in many EU countries.  
The 2015 Energy Union Package (European Commission, 2015), clarified and 
updated in the 2016 Clean Energy Package, proposes integrating RES-E through market-
based schemes. It also envisages greater longer-term policy coherence through a stable 
investment framework that reduces regulatory risk for investors and achieves security of 
supply. There will be an EU-wide target of 27% of gross final energy from RES by 2030, 
supported by voluntary commitments and reporting—rather than mandatory national targets.  
 An important feature of EU policy is that it sets targets for both RES and carbon 
emissions reductions. The RES target is designed to encourage Member States to continue 
subsidizing RES above the value of the carbon saved to compensate for learning externalities 
that continue to drive down costs. However, since the RES target also reduces emissions, it 
decreases the carbon price in the EU ETS (for a given CO2 cap), which in turn perversely 
favours more emissions-intensive generation—unless the cap is suitably adjusted at the same 
time. Böhringer et al. (2009) estimate that the costs of meeting the 2020 climate targets are 
substantially raised by inconsistencies between different targets, relative to a very modest 
welfare loss under a theoretical least-cost policy.  
There are very different jurisdictional trade-offs within the “Energy Trilemma”. 
Germany has achieved its RES objectives and maintained security of supply at considerable 
domestic cost and increased CO2 emissions from its nuclear phase-out—together with large 
spillover benefits for the rest of the world. German consumers have paid €125 billion in 
higher electricity bills for RES support schemes in the years between the 2000 Renewable 
Energy Act (EEG) up to 2015; it has been estimated that, over the next 20 years, overall costs 
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may exceed €400 billion (Andor et al., 2017).6 By contrast, the UK has set ambitious binding 
environmental targets but has emphasized achieving them at reasonable cost, and hence 
committed subsidies more cautiously than other countries (Anaya and Pollitt, 2016)— 
although it is currently at risk of missing its 2020 RES target and breaching the Levy Control 
Framework that limits RES subsidies (Pollitt, 2017).
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3. Impacts of renewables on EU electricity markets to date 
Current market designs have achieved substantial learning gains across renewable 
technologies. Solar PV costs fell to less than one-tenth of their 1992 value in the 20 years 
thereafter; costs continue to fall as deployment rises, with an estimated learning rate of 17-
22% (i.e., for every doubling of the installed capacity, unit costs fall by 17-22% in real 
terms).
8
 The learning rate for onshore wind has been estimated at 7% and for offshore wind at 
9% (King et al. 2015, Rubin et al. 2015). While there is considerable uncertainty about the 
precise degree of learning (Nordhaus, 2014; Farmer and Lefond, 2016), it is clear that cost 
reductions have been very large.
9
 
In the short run, the addition of zero marginal cost RES shifts the supply curve to the 
right, causing the wholesale price and capacity utilization rates of coal- and gas-fired plant to 
fall. These effects, together with the demand shocks arising from the financial crisis, have 
substantially lowered the market capitalization of major European utilities.  On some days, 
notably in Germany, high RES has led to negative prices as system operators (SOs) have 
sought to protect the grid from overloading due to higher-than-expected renewable supply.
10
 
This is a perverse consequence of only paying subsidies to RES provided they are dispatched, 
coupled with priority dispatch; it is avoided in Ireland, which prohibits negative price bidding 
by RES. 
The magnitude of the ensuing price declines was not widely foreseen, neither by 
policymakers nor many of the energy companies themselves—who continued to invest in 
base-load fossil fuel power plants in anticipation of high wholesale prices and high capacity 
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utilization. Figure 1 illustrates the downward trend in Germany: over 5 years, wholesale 
prices have fallen by 50%. While other factors, such as falling fossil fuel and carbon prices 
also played a role, the estimates by Hirth (2016) suggest that almost half of the German 
electricity price decline can be attributed to the expansion of RES. These price reductions 
have essentially shifted rents from conventional electricity generators to consumers. 
Relatedly, major wholesale markets have also seen increased volatility of prices. 
Over the longer run, this “merit order effect” can have other consequences. The 
downward pressure on wholesale prices undermines the investment incentives of fossil-fuel 
generators, which are in the medium term needed to provide firmness and flexibility to the 
system, thus potentially undermining security of supply (Praktiknjo and Erdmann, 2016). 
From the viewpoint of conventional generators, the “merit order effect” exacerbates the 
problem of missing money. More RES can also weaken the role of forward contracting in 
alleviating market power in wholesale electricity markets (Allaz and Vila, 1993)—and lead to 
higher prices in situations where the RES capacity factor is low due to strong intermittency 
(Ritz, 2016). 
 
Figure 1: Wholesale power price in Germany (2011-2016 monthly average) 
 
Source: Fraunhofer ISE 
 
The impact of RES on market power is also mixed. In the Italian wholesale market 
(IPEX), market power was considerably weakened by RES competition during peak hours 
(over 2010 to 2013). Yet market power was exacerbated during some off-peak hours, in the 
absence of solar RES in particular zones, in which congestion yielded market splitting—and 
hence increased the ability of incumbent generators to raise prices (Bigerna et al., 2016). The 
situation may be worsened as more fossil-fuel plants close, further reducing capacity and 
competition in off-peak hours. As a result, market surveillance will need to evolve with RES 
penetration to distinguish between actual scarcity (which can be efficient) and abuse of 
market power. 
High levels of intermittent renewables like wind and solar PV can create considerable 
problems for delivering reliable and secure electricity supply. The system requires firm 
replacement when they are not available (on windless nights), and it also requires inertia or 
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other forms of frequency and voltage stabilization, that is, flexibility services to maintain 
quality of service. In Italy, for example, the rise of RES has resulted in an increase in critical 
load-following requirements for conventional plants, and with that a need for additional 
reserves and a risk of excessive intermittent priority-dispatch generation (“over-generation”) 
in some hours, and a worsening of power quality (Clerici et al., 2015). Ancillary services are 
becoming increasingly scarce as conventional plant is displaced or exits because of 
inadequate revenue. System Operators and regulators are already increasingly seeking to 
ensure adequate flexibility services, e.g., on the island of Ireland through the DS3 program, 
and in GB through procuring additional fast frequency response.  
The “integration costs” of intermittent solar and wind generation consist of all the 
economic costs they impose on the rest of the system: grid expansion, increased balancing 
services, and more flexible operation. At high RES penetration rates of 30-40%, system-level 
integration costs have been estimated at 25-35 €/MWh, including the substantial adverse 
impacts of lower and more variable capacity utilization on conventional generators (Hirth et 
al., 2015).
11
 These estimates thus account for a large fraction of overall generation costs—and 
electricity prices. 
In summary, the “1st generation market design” has accommodated RES shares to up 
to almost 30% of generation capacity, with a variety of impacts – some anticipated, others 
less so. Countries have adapted in different ways, depending on their generation mix and 
degree of interconnection to their neighbours. Yet the existing design is reaching the end of 
the road: it cannot adequately cope with the scale of Europe’s COP21 climate commitments. 
Indeed, the EU’s baseline projections suggest that current policies are not going to deliver the 
emissions reductions required (European Commission, 2016b). 
What is needed is a market design that can support the delivery of the very high levels 
of renewables that will be required to meet the EU’s climate goals. A key challenge lies in the 
uncertainty around future technologies and other market disruptors such as the rate of decline 
in distributed generation (DG) costs and consumer responses to smart metering.  
 
4. General principles for electricity market design 
This section sets out principles for improving electricity market design for a high-RES world. 
The economist’s ideal market design is that of “complete markets” in which all products and 
services are efficiently priced by the marketplace (see Schweppe et al. 1988), to reflect their 
economic cost and value: 
Time – electricity prices are determined at a very granular temporal level, e.g., second 
by second, now and for trade in the future, up to 10-30 years hence; 
Space – prices vary at a granular spatial level – perhaps at each connection point in 
the network, reflecting how demand or costs differ across locations; 
Carbon and other emissions – climate and air pollutant damages are priced at their 
social cost and thus incorporated into decision-making by companies. 
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The EU’s current Target Electricity Model is very incomplete in specifying the desirable 
changes; its market design fails on all of the above criteria: pricing is too coarse over time 
and space—and carbon emissions remain under-priced.12 
The ideal is unattainable in practice but it provides a strong vision for a “2nd 
generation market design” to work towards. The desirability of more granular temporal and 
spatial prices applies even without reference to climate concerns as the need for more types 
and volumes of flexibility services increases. The EU’s climate targets, if anything, 
strengthen the case for efficient market design given the need to price externalities as well as 
the case for minimizing overall system costs whilst achieving reliability. 
The following principles are a high-level guide to shaping future policy. In practice, 
there are a variety of political and institutional constraints around market design. Important 
considerations include a widespread public preference for offshore wind over onshore 
installations (despite their higher costs) and the infeasibility of (new) nuclear generation in 
countries such as Germany. The principles explicitly allow for flexibility across different 
countries and in light of new information about technologies. 
 
Principle 1: Correct the market failures as close as possible to their source, relying on 
subsidiarity as much as possible. Guided by the “principle of targeting” (Sandmo, 1975), 
market failures should be corrected at the national or EU-wide level. Climate change is 
inherently a global problem while RES targets are a way of equitably allocating the cost of 
RD&D across MSs to deliver learning benefits. Similarly, rules and standards for electricity 
trading and auction design benefit from an EU-wide approach. However, many details of 
market design can be left to MSs, subject to fair trading across borders. 
 
Principle 2: Allow for appropriate cross-country variation in market design across MSs 
rather than a one-size-fits-all solution. Countries differ significantly in the quality and 
quantity of their resource endowments, the reserve capacity given existing generation assets, 
the stability of institutional and policy frameworks, the legacy interests protecting the status 
quo, and in the willingness of consumers to adjust their behaviour. Some countries will thus 
be able to push towards a better market design more strongly and/or quickly than others. 
Moreover, ensuring security of supply is inherently a local issue (albeit with ramifications 
across borders).  
 
Principle 3: Use price signals and regulated network tariffs to reflect the value of all 
electricity services and deliver the least system cost solution. An efficient market design 
uses prices to signal the value of all electricity services provided (Schweppe et al., 1988). 
This has a long-run and a short-run dimension—ensuring the right location for investment (in 
renewables and other forms of generation) and an efficient dispatch once connected. This 
delivers the desired level of low-carbon electricity at least overall cost to consumers. 
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Principle 4: Collect the difference between the regulated allowed revenue and efficient 
prices in the least distortionary way from final consumers. This difference amounts to a 
levy to finance the natural monopoly akin to a tax. Good public finance principles imply that 
it should be targeted on final consumers rather than producers (such as generators or storage 
operators) and should be concentrated on inelastic demands (Diamond and Mirrlees, 1971). 
Since capacity demands are usually less elastic than energy demands, this generally favours 
capacity charges. As with taxation more generally, this is subject to fairness considerations.
13
 
 
Principle 5: Efficiently “de-risk” the financing of low-carbon investment as the 
electricity system becomes more capital-intensive. A high-RES (and zero carbon) system is 
relatively more capital-intensive than the fossil-fuel system of the past. This enhances the 
importance of efficiently de-risking investment as far as possible within a stable regulatory 
framework that helps minimize the cost of capital. That involves balancing the allocation of 
risk to those best able to bear it (normally consumers) while retaining incentives to manage 
that risk (normally the owner of the plant).
14
 
 
Principle 6: Retain flexibility to respond to new information on the attractiveness of 
different low-carbon technologies. Over time, new information will become available on 
the relative costs and benefits of different technologies that reduce emissions or enhance 
flexibility. Policy should create possibilities for such learning (e.g., via auctions) and 
experimentation, providing support for promising technologies where appropriate. 
 
The analysis in the following section applies these principles to develop a set of policy 
recommendations for a future high-RES European electricity system. 
 
5. Economic analysis of key market-design elements  
Intermittent RES presents more significant challenges to balancing supply and demand than 
controllable generation. These challenges can be addressed in three ways: (1) demand and 
supply can be shifted over space (via interconnectors and transmission links) to provide local 
balance; (2) demand and supply can be shifted or over time (via storage); or (3) demand and 
supply can be balanced by invoking more flexible responses (e.g., through pricing).  
 This section presents economic analysis of six key mechanisms to address these 
challenges: interconnection and market integration, electricity storage, the design of RES 
support systems, distributed generation, efficient electricity pricing and long-term contracts.  
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5.1. Benefits of cross-border integration & interconnection 
The rise of intermittent RES generation further strengthens arguments for greater cross-
border integration and raises the value of more interconnection within Europe. 
Interconnectors can deliver back-up power when intermittent RES are unavailable;  
by connecting areas with uncorrelated wind, they reduce the variability of that source of 
supply (due to intermittency) and dampen the volatility of power prices (Neuhoff et al., 
2013). Sharing reserves across borders reduces the cost of ensuring reliability (DECC, 2013). 
Modern controllable DC interconnectors can also provide a number of flexibility services.  
Ensuring that interconnectors are efficiently used and properly remunerated for all the 
services they can supply (as per Principle 3) both reduces the short-run cost of integrating 
renewables and increases the attractiveness of investing in additional interconnection 
(Newbery, 2016b). Better use of existing interconnectors and investment in new 
interconnector capacity increase the flexibility of the European system to exploit the natural 
advantages of the system as a whole (Newbery et al., 2016). These advantages include access 
to hydro reserves (such as those in Norway), large amounts of predictable solar power in 
Italy, Spain and Greece and the often negative correlation between wind speeds at locations 
up to one thousand miles apart (as weather fronts move across Europe) with the consequent 
ability to economize on back-up fossil fuel capacity. Real-time supply and demand balancing 
of national electricity systems with high RES shares is no longer sensible. 
Denmark and Germany have already benefitted substantially from interconnection in 
their roles as leaders in RES deployment. For example, Denmark typically exports surplus 
night-time power to Norway; by reducing Norway’s hydro use, this indirectly stores the 
surplus which can then be exported to Denmark in the day-time to meet any generation 
shortfalls. Much of its wind is exported in winter when co-generated district heating takes 
priority and delivers power to the grid. 
 
Short-term benefits of cross-border integration 
The benefits of market integration in the short-run derive from the more efficient use of the 
existing network, and specifically, of the interconnectors via market coupling. The price 
difference between adjacent price zones then reflects the value of capacity on that link, giving 
both a return to the link owner, and signaling where new interconnections might be 
profitable. Market coupling increases the use and value of interconnectors, also encouraging 
investment in new interconnectors over the longer haul.  
Table 1 summarizes the EU-wide short-run benefits of market integration from 
fulfilling the Third Package (by using existing interconnections), as estimated by Newbery et 
al. (2016). The annual total of €3.9bn represents 2.5% of the 2012 value of total EU 
wholesale demand of €150 billion/yr. Table 1 breaks this total down into various sources, 
estimated usually from a sample of observations on individual interconnectors. The arbitrage 
benefits from day-ahead coupling are worth roughly one-quarter of the potential gains, with 
larger benefits from shared balancing resources and avoiding undesirable unscheduled flows. 
In a similar vein, Boffa et al. (2010) suggest that even relatively small improvements in 
interconnection can already bring about substantial benefits, and estimate annual gains of 
around €120mn from North-South market integration within the Italian electricity market. 
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Table 1: Potential short-run gains from EU-wide market integration 
  ACER sample 2012 EU-28 estimate 
  € million NTC 2012 €'000/MWyr € million Shares 
Day-ahead coupling 300 22,000 13.6 1,010 26% 
Intraday coupling  10,050 2.6 (MWh) 37 1% 
Balancing 575 17,550 32.8 1,343 35% 
Unscheduled flows 988 34,900 28.3 1,360 35% 
Curtailment 19 26,075 0.7 130 3% 
Total gains       3,880 100% 
 
Note: The ACER sample is a subset of all interconnectors. The EU-28 estimate is scaled up using the values per 
MWyr derived from the sample. NTC is Net Transfer Capacity of the interconnectors, a measure of their usable 
size. The values for intra-day coupling are per MWh, curtailment is based on import and export flows together.  
Source: Newbery, Strbac and Viehoff (2016).  
 
As intermittent RES generation increases, markets such as Norway and the Iberian 
Peninsula, are increasingly attractive for interconnection as their huge storage capacities 
(70TWh and 25TWh, respectively) allow them to act as a large batteries, evening out price 
fluctuations over days and weeks. Intermittent generation would otherwise require rapid 
changes in controllable output that would be reflected in very variable prices. Increasing 
interconnections to these markets would reduce this volatility but leave enough to create 
arbitrage opportunities and maintain the interconnector revenues needed for investment. 
While increased interconnection brings substantial overall (net) benefits, these are not 
necessarily shared evenly across countries or regions (Spiecker et al., 2013), suggesting that 
the details of different MSs policies should differ (Principle 2). For example, while more 
efficient use of electricity will typically reduce overall carbon emissions, it may raise 
emissions at one end of the interconnector (Denny et al., 2011). A detailed cost-benefit 
analysis is therefore required to evaluate the desirability and efficiency of each 
interconnection. 
Countries that are interconnected to the Continent through controllable DC links and 
are not part of the meshed Continental network have greater control over what happens in 
their markets without adversely impacting others and should thus be granted more flexibility, 
while those impacting neighbours may need more harmonization (Principle 2). 
 
Longer-term interconnector benefits 
The day-ahead arbitrage benefits can be estimated by looking at price differences across 
borders. ACER (2015, Figure 84) provides for a sample of 24 such links; for the top 15 
interconnectors, this would be €68,000/MWyr. For a 1,000 MW link this gives revenue of 
€68 million/yr, capable of justifying substantial new investment. Moreover, these revenues 
represent only a fraction of the potential value of interconnections (around 25% in Table 1).  
Newbery et al. (2016) estimate the benefits of integrating EU markets for a high-RES 
2030 scenario. The potential benefits of sharing reserves, balancing, expanding 
interconnection where profitable, as well as allocating RES to the best resource locations, 
range from €13-40 billion per year for the EU as a whole. The wide range reflects uncertainty 
about future RES levels and costs as well as fuel and carbon prices. If only half the justified 
 13 
transmission is built, benefits fall by €4 billion/year; sharing reserves (rather than targeting 
self-sufficiency) raises benefits by €6 billion/year. 
 
5.2. The medium-term potential of electric energy storage 
While interconnection allows balancing over wider areas, storage offers the potential to 
balance over time. Indeed, existing pumped storage schemes were typically constructed to 
deal with inflexible supply, particularly nuclear, in the face of varying demand. Recent 
developments in battery technology, driven largely by laptop computers and mobile phones, 
has considerably lowered the cost of batteries, and the prospective demand for battery electric 
vehicles (EVs) offers hope that prices will continue to fall. This has led many to conclude 
that batteries will be a key element in addressing the growing problems of intermittent RES. 
However, it is important to retain perspective, especially for the shorter term. 
Batteries are currently a tiny fraction of grid-scale energy storage overall, making up only 3 
GWh or 0.1% of pumped storage. Even if their costs halved they remain extremely 
expensive. Optimistic forecasts for Tesla batteries in 2020 show their levelised running costs 
at $175/MWh, to which would be added the cost of the energy purchased (allowing for 
storage losses of 10%). This would require a very high value for the delivered energy to 
justify arbitrage. Battery storage, as such, is unlikely to be viable for time-shifting supply in 
current electricity markets (Staffell and Rustomji, 2016).  
In practice, batteries are only justified for the other services they can offer— 
specifically, very fast frequency response and the ability to defer expensive network 
investments in certain places (Ruz and Pollitt, 2016). The main obstacles to their widespread 
economic use is that the fundamentals of electro-chemistry rule out dramatic breakthroughs 
in efficiency, while the cost of providing enough total storage capacity to buffer more than 
very short-term fluctuations (of less than an hour) is prohibitive—primarily because of the 
limited number of cycles of charge and discharge that a battery can experience before it 
degrades. 
While mass-manufactured battery cells and packs may become significantly cheaper, 
grid-scale battery facilities will, likely, not fall as rapidly in cost. This is because of less 
technological progress in the other elements of grid-scale facility costs; for example, in 
distribution grid-scale lithium-battery storage, cell and pack costs amount to around 40% of 
overall facility costs (Sidhu et al., 2017). This suggests that dispatchable grid-scale batteries 
may not become as widespread as distributed behind-the-meter batteries (which will show up 
on the system in changed demand patterns). 
Pumped Storage Plants (PSPs) represent the most established form of bulk electrical 
energy storage (EES) (Barbour et al., 2016). Newbery (2016c) estimates the total global PSP 
capacity at 2.9 TWh, of which 0.4 TWh for the EU. The merit of PSPs is their long life and 
low depreciation; their high capital cost and limited opportunities for capacity additions are 
serious limitations as their capital cost adds £40-£80/MWh to the cost of buying electricity 
given pumping losses of 25%. PSPs typically only earn a quarter of their revenue from 
arbitrage; the balance comes from flexibility services, for which they, like batteries, can be 
very valuable. 
By comparison, hydro capacity was 979 GW worldwide in 2012, generating 3,288 
TWh/year (or 16% of world electricity output), of which 173 GW is located in Europe and 
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144 GW in the EU together with Norway and Switzerland (EIA, 2016). Newbery (2016b) 
estimates its total hydro reserves at 2,144 TWh—equal to 2,700 times the global PSP 
capacity. Hydro can be used indirectly as storage by offsetting the intermittency in RES 
electricity production. Interconnecting EU markets to Norway (with its 70 TWh in dams) is 
the obvious route, subject to the corresponding cost-benefit analysis 
The storage capacity of EVs can be estimated. If their share of the EU car fleet grows 
to 10% by 2025, there could be some 26 million EVs,
15
 which, with 20 kWh/EV, would give 
0.5 TWh—which is comparable to current PSP capacity (Newbery, 2016c). (Even at 100% 
EVs, this would yield “only” 5 TWh.) Moreover, while this may seem large by comparison 
with stand-alone batteries, only a part of it is (indirectly) accessible, in that timing of charges 
provides some demand shifting. However, the EV fleet may not be large enough to cost-
effectively provide ancillary services until 2030 (Bishop et al., 2016). 
The large-scale rollout of EVs will require incentives and/or controls over the time of 
charging since otherwise EV owners are likely to charge them at similar times (e.g. after 
work), which would put extra additional pressure on the electrical system. However, evidence 
suggests that EV owners are responsive to time-of-use charging so they can provide demand-
side response (Newbery and Strbac, 2016). Other studies suggest that the business models 
around private EV participation in electricity markets will be challenging due to high 
payment expectations of vehicle owners for third-party access to their vehicles (Parsons et al., 
2014). 
As intermittency increases, the volume and value of EES will increase. However, EES 
is only one of several ways of providing flexibility—along with, e.g., interconnectors, 
flexible generation and demand side response (DSR)—and is often a very expensive, and thus 
unlikely to be a cost-minimizing solution (Principle 3). While superficially attractive, grid-
scale battery storage remains too expensive to use beyond those projects where it has very 
high value-added, such as very fast frequency response and relieving network capacity 
(Pudjianto et al. 2014; Newbery, 2016c). By comparison, other forms of storage such as using 
PSPs and fossil fuel stocks remain relatively cheap. 
That said, battery storage looks likely to play two main roles in the foreseeable future, 
which policy may support (Principle 6): first, batteries can defer upgrade investment in 
transmission and distribution systems by shaving peak use; second, varying charging rates of 
EVs may improve the management of power flows on the electricity network. 
 
5.3. Designing more efficient RES support mechanisms 
There have been many experiments with how to support RES while it has been more 
expensive than fossil generation (CEER, 2015). RES subsidies such as feed-in-tariffs (FiTs) 
that offer fixed prices for a period have successfully brought forth renewables in large 
quantities. However, in many cases, they have been very generous and pushed up system 
costs by distorting location decisions. Auctions offer a more attractive solution.  
In addition to FiTs, some Member States have used a Premium FiT (PFiT, also known 
as Feed-In Premium or FIP), which pays a fixed premium to the current wholesale market 
                                                        
15
 There are projected to be 255 million cars in the EU by 2025; see 
http://www.theicct.org/sites/default/files/publications/ICCT_EU-pocketbook_2015.pdf  
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price, or a green certificate (Renewable Obligation Certificate, ROC) (Haas et al., 2011; 
CEER, 2015, Table 5).
16
 The first type usually offers priority dispatch and places such 
obligations on the System Operator (SO), the latter two options usually place the marketing 
and balancing obligation on the RES generator. In 2013, FiTs accounted for about 58% of 
supported output, green certificates for 26% and PFiTs for 16%.
17
 PFiTs are the EU’s 
currently preferred option. 
 Auctions for RES support used to date have been very competitive, in line with 
Principle 6. For example, the results of the UK’s auctions since 2014 suggest that these 
undercut the administrative prices offered by governments by a significant margin (Newbery, 
2016a). This is supported by international experience in competitive tendering for solar 
energy, which has seen steep declines in procurement costs of both solar and wind 
installations (IEA, 2016). More use of auctions for pre-determined volumes of RES also has 
the advantage of controlling the overall amount of subsidy that governments commit to.  
Auctions can and should be portioned into different technologies according to their 
relative maturity (for example, mature technologies such as onshore wind and solar PV in one 
auction and less mature technologies such as offshore wind in another). Clearing prices 
across these auctions will likely differ, and indeed this is what happened in the UK 
renewables support auction in February 2015.
18
 They can be held regularly to encourage the 
supply chain; the capacity to be procured should adjust over time in line with learning about 
the cost evolution of different technologies. High-cost mature technologies will naturally be 
displaced by lower-cost alternatives, and less mature technologies should only be pursued 
while their prospects of becoming competitive justify the additional support. 
We also suggest the extension of the use of auctions that are specifically aimed at 
promoting smaller scale RES projects. California has had a particularly successful experience 
with regular auctions (RAM) by individual distribution companies to procure 3-20 MW 
facilities around the distribution system. These auctions have included valuation of some of 
system integration costs and benefits in ranking the winning bidders in the auctions.
19
 
If carbon prices move towards reflecting social costs, the remaining market failure 
associated with RES is the learning benefit, which arises from their design, manufacturing 
and installation (rather than the subsequent operation of the plant). Guided by Principle 1, this 
suggests that subsidies should be directed towards capacity rather than output, as has largely 
been the case across MSs to date.
20
 An attractive variant used in China (Steinhilber, 2016) is 
to specify a FiT for a fixed number of MWh/MW capacity—e.g., 30,000 MWh/MW for a 
wind turbine, which is in effect a capacity support, as total lifetime subsidy does not depend 
on the output in any individual hour, which is therefore valued at the spot price.  
                                                        
16
 The value of a ROC is determined by the demand for and supply of these certificates, and is then 
added to the wholesale price. The demand is an obligation placed on retailers for a specified fraction 
of their sales, the supply is proportional to metered RES output. 
17
 Figures based on CEER (2015, Annex 9). 
18
 See NAO (2016) on the use of auctions by government to procure renewables. 
19
 See Anaya and Pollitt (2015). 
20
 If carbon remains underpriced and a MS is unwilling to impose a carbon price floor, then a possible 
“second-best” remedy is an additional subsidy to zero-carbon power, set at the average carbon 
intensity of fossil generation times the shortfall in the carbon price (below the social cost of carbon), 
which would be reduced) over time as the carbon-price shortfalls declines. 
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Future policy could therefore better target support on capacity (MWs) by offering an 
auction-determined payment per MWh for a fixed number of MWh/MW capacity (in addition 
to revenues from wholesale and other markets). This would de-risk the investment by making 
the payment stream predictable (Principle 5) and hence making it more suitable to be bond-
financed. It would also encourage the best locations to be exploited first while not distorting 
the bids of renewable generators in the energy and ancillary services market. It would avoid 
the current situation where RES generators will bid negative prices in the wholesale market, 
up to the value of their lost per MWh subsidy.
21
 As the share of RES rises on the system, this 
would be a way of ensuring that RES, once built, participated on equal and cost-reflective 
terms with conventional generation—in the spirit of Principle 3. 
 The wind and the sun vary over time and space and so will the cost per MWh from 
these sources. But to that cost must be added the transmission and balancing costs. Distant 
wind farms may have higher capacity factors but they incur considerably higher transmission 
costs—and it is that total cost that matters.22 In the case of a FiT or PFiT, if the support price 
is set high enough to even encourage the least-favoured location, then it will over-reward 
those in favoured locations. This raises the cost of procuring a given amount of capacity 
investment (and RES learning benefits). 
By contrast, if RES is supported per MWh/MW of capacity, rather than per MWh of 
output delivered, there is less inducement to locate in distant locations in response to a higher 
incentive per MWh. That has the benefit that it does not over-reward RES in favourable 
locations.
23
 With locational pricing or zonal pricing with bidding zones based on structural 
network congestion, it also discourages excessive connection in constrained locations.
24
 This 
would make better use of the existing network, and reduce the effect of current subsidies in 
exaggerating power flows when the network is congested. Assuming that a plant delivers at 
least the specified number of MWh, the only remaining (minor) distortion towards windier 
but less efficient locations is earning the subsidy more rapidly. 
 
Understanding locational distortions due to feed-in-tariffs  
A simple example illustrates how most existing RES support schemes lead to inefficient 
location decisions even with nodal pricing. Suppose that the nodal price in a distant windy 
location is €20/MWh (averaged over hours of wind generation) while it is €40/MWh near a 
major demand centre. The windy location has a capacity factor of 3,000 hrs/yr (i.e. produces 
3,000 MWh/MW capacity) while the demand centre has a wind capacity factor of 2,000 
                                                        
21
 Output payments make it worth bidding a negative price to be dispatched up to the amount of the 
premium (less any variable operating expenditure, OPEX), and this can distort the merit order, as it is 
costless to disconnect wind and PV, in contrast to disconnecting inflexible nuclear and fossil plants 
that are costly to restart. 
22
 The value of power at any time and place does not depend on its source (fossil, nuclear or 
renewable), but the marginal cost of delivering the power to that place should reflect transmission 
constraints and losses (which would be assured by nodal pricing). 
23
 While the discussion here relates to location within a country, there is a wider problem that current 
rules make it hard for any MS to locate RES in more favourable foreign locations and gain credit for 
meeting its target. 
24
 A potential countervailing factor is the widespread public preference against wind installations that 
are located onshore, for example, in proximity to densely populated areas. 
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hrs/yr. So the value of the windy location is €60,000/MWyr and at the demand centre is 
€80,000/MWyr and so more valuable. If a wind investor receives a FiT of €80/MWh in both 
locations, then it would choose to locate in the windy place – where it produces more output 
but less value to society. 
A PFiTs responds to local wholesale prices; it is less distorting than a FiT—but the 
premium element still creates a distortion. If wind is paid a PFiT, say with a premium of 
€40/MWh, then the windy farm earns €(20+40) x 3,000 = €180,000/MWyr and the demand-
centred farm earns €(40+40) x 2,000 = €160,000/MWyr, so incentives still point to the wrong 
location. If the demand centre instead had 2,500 windy hours, the FiT would still favour the 
windy location. But the PFiT would now earn €60 x 2,500 = €150,000/MWyr in the windy 
location, less than the €160,000/MWyr at the centre, and so would locate in the right place. 
 
5.4. Impacts of the move towards distributed generation 
Distributed generation (DG) has been a major trend in the connection of RES in Europe. 
Governments have favoured small-scale renewables with more generous subsidies and this 
seems likely to continue. DG represents electric power generation within distribution 
networks or on the customer side of the network.
25
 It is a leading example of the 
decentralization of the electricity markets. 
 DG consists of small-scale technologies often situated near homes and businesses 
where electricity is used, offering an alternative to large-scale centralized generation and 
potentially reducing line losses. It also offers electricity consumers the prospect of “self-
sufficiency” which may be of intrinsic value to small (often household) consumers (partly 
since it provides tax-free returns on investment by reducing post-tax expenditure on energy). 
DG can be built more quickly than new central power systems, and can eliminate the cost of 
installing new transmission lines. Many forms of DG are cleaner than current conventional 
power, and should be able to provide ancillary services, and can contribute to security of 
supply if consumers switch to it during stress periods (Alanne and Saari, 2006; Cossent et al., 
2011; Ruggiero et al., 2015).  
However, DG has drawbacks. It can be technically challenging to efficiently integrate 
the increasing number of small generation units in an electricity system that up to now has 
been centralised, integrated and planned. A major problem to date has been the lack of 
visibility of DG to the authority charged with measuring capacity adequacy. DG, particularly 
solar PV, may cause voltage instability throughout the grid (Pepermans et al., 2005; Shah et 
al., 2012),
26
 impacting power quality. Last but not least, the unit costs of small wind and solar 
PV are typically higher than for larger grid-scale installations. 
DG can reduce losses and the need for system capacity upgrades, so the shift to DG 
over time could in some cases tend to reduce the size of the distribution system, thus also 
reducing overall system costs. But this effect does not look likely to be very material in most 
of Europe (Pollitt and Strielkowski, 2016).  
                                                        
25
 In Anglo-American countries it is often called “embedded generation”, in Europe and Asia 
“decentralized generation” or “distributed energy”, while some prefer “small-scale generation”. 
26
 The “50.2 Hz” problem in Germany is a salutary example, see e.g. 
http://www.modernpowersystems.com/features/featuredealing-with-the-50.2-hz-problem/ 
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DG with battery systems can lead to the possibility of grid-defection, reducing fixed 
network cost contributions from those customers and giving rise to a “utility death-spiral” 
(Athawale and Felder, 2016). This seems unlikely in Europe since most prosumers need 
access the network for “export” and prosumers still need “import” capability; having enough 
own battery storage to last through the depth of the winter is not currently an option, even in 
southern Europe. 
Yet the possibility of large-scale network defection exists—and with it, there are risks 
to the viability of some poorly designed network business/regulatory models. System cost 
comparisons between on-grid and off-grid supply depend on fossil fuel prices, energy subsidy 
charging regimes (often recovered via electricity bills) and the way in which network fixed 
costs are recovered from consumers (see Pollitt, 2016). Some consumers might find it 
desirable and profitable to defect from the network, even though the true economic cost of 
remaining grid-connected is lower. 
The combination of a household with PV, a battery and an EV might in the future 
offer a grid defection opportunity in sunny parts of Europe. While this will be appealing to 
some households and could enhance security of supply, it is unclear if it would be efficient 
from the viewpoint of the whole economy. If this does begin to happen, regulators would 
sensibly take steps to ensure that such households are not being effectively subsidised to 
disconnect or undercharged for options to reconnect to the grid—in line with Principle 3. 
 
Charging mechanisms for DG and distortions from net metering 
A considerable fraction of RES is of modest scale and locates on distribution networks, while 
roof-top PV is usually behind the meter of the household (although it may be separately 
metered). “Net metering” arises when the meter only measures gross consumption less the 
amount generated on the premises, usually without distinguishing times and hence different 
values for importing and exporting power. Distribution Network Operators (DNOs) are often 
under different ownership from the grid, and pay to connect to the grid, in turn recovering 
that cost from customers. This often leads to DNOs paying an embedded benefit to DG to the 
extent that it reduces the charges paid to the grid operator.  
Most regulated networks use tariffs to recover their average costs, which can be much 
higher than marginal costs—particularly in a mature grid with low demand growth. Worse, if 
the grid has to invest heavily to deliver distant wind energy, and these costs are recovered 
across all DNOs, the difference between average and marginal cost can (and has in GB) 
become very large. Where the DNO pays an embedded benefit to DG for reducing power 
taken from the grid the excess of the average over marginal transmission cost gives a highly 
distortionary subsidy to generation connecting to distribution networks rather than 
transmission networks. It is therefore important for regulators (who are tasked with protecting 
consumer interests, often with specific duties to protect poor and vulnerable customers) to 
compute the efficient tariffs (moderated to take into account their equity effects) tariffs that 
impact location and operating decisions (Principle 3), and target the recovery of any shortfall 
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on final consumers (Principle 4) in the least distorting way possible (e.g. by the size of their 
connection, or their specified maximum demand, or in peak winter hours).
27
  
The efficient subsidy to confront DG would be the marginal avoided cost of grid 
reinforcement less the marginal cost of distribution reinforcement required; this might be 
negative, i.e., an additional subsidy. Applying this principle, households with PV would be 
paid the appropriate support for PV but pay for the full network costs of meeting their 
consumption. Such households will still use the network when the sun is not shining (and the 
peak is likely to be on dark winter evenings). Yet they usually pay the network charges per 
kWh, so under “net metering” (charges only on net electricity consumption, i.e., consumption 
less PV output) they avoid costs while enjoying the benefits of reliable access to power. 
These existing charging mechanisms for DG have been leading to substantial wealth 
transfers between different customer groups in countries with high domestic RES penetration 
and high distribution system costs. Solar PV consumers have lower metered consumption due 
to their own production. This significantly reduces their share of the per kWh costs of the 
distribution system. As revenue cap regulation of the distribution charges requires the same 
revenue to be collected as demand has fallen, per-unit charges have risen and the distribution 
of their payment between different types of households has changed.  
Inspired by the methodology developed by Simshauser (2016), we derive the 
differences in network charge contributions between solar and non-solar residential 
consumers in Northern England. A difference of £33.50/year or around 6% of the typical bill 
(if metered import was reduced by 1200 kWh due to having PV in the presence of a 
2.792p/kWh distribution charge) is what the retail companies pay to the DNO for a non-PV 
household compared to the households with solar PV. This effect is magnified by the retail 
tariff (where the unit charge is 14p/kWh, more than twice the pure energy cost). Households 
with solar PV are therefore benefitting from the current tariff scheme although their solar 
power generation does not seem to affect their overall peak consumption behavior and hence 
use of the grid. This effect is further exacerbated as the charges to fund the PV (and other 
RES) subsidies are levied on net metered consumption  
DG should bear the costs it imposes on the network in a fair and politically acceptable 
fashion. Recent studies have shown that large inequities can arise quite quickly in some 
jurisdictions, for example, in Simshauser’s (2016) analysis of PV uptake in South 
Queensland. The existing system favours those with DG—likely richer consumers—who do 
not bear the efficient or fair share of the total system distribution and transmission costs. 
More generally, domestic PV subsidies often have been generous in absolute terms and 
disproportionately taken up by richer households while higher electricity prices affect poorer 
households relatively more strongly.
28
 
                                                        
27
 This accords with the principles of good public finance that revenue-raising taxes should not distort 
production decisions, as set out by Diamond and Mirrlees (1971). It is moderated to the extent that if 
the Government is not willing to take full responsibility for addressing poverty, the regulator may be 
charged to protect vulnerable consumers with e.g. lifeline rates that scale back fixed charges for the 
first kWh/month. 
28
 In the UK, for example, CEPA and PB (2011, p.11) found that expected returns to the PV Feed-in-
Tariff were the highest among a broad range of asset classes (with 5-8% post-tax real returns) while 
DECC (2012, p.12) reported that UK households in the top income decile were 16 times more likely 
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 Consequently the apportionment of charges between fixed, per kW peak and per kWh 
use of system charges needs to be changed to be more cost-reflective—as well as finding 
ways of exempting at least poorer households from financing RES that is largely taken up by 
richer households. These hidden subsidies are becoming more significant as the direct 
subsidy to RES has been coming down. Some jurisdictions outside Europe, notably Hawaii 
and Arizona, have already altered their distribution charging regimes to address this problem 
(by moving away from per kWh import charging).
29
 
 
5.5. Efficient pricing for dispatch and investment 
In a low-RES world, demand is fairly predictable and mid-merit fossil fuel plants can easily 
be turned up and down to meet real-time changes in demand or network constraints. This 
cheap controllability meant the value of high-resolution prices (e.g., 5 minutes or less) was 
limited. Prices could be set for relatively long periods (30 minutes or an hour) and the System 
Operator (SO) could adjust output (reserves) and/or re-dispatch plant within these time 
windows and across wide areas (regional price zones). 
Today both the need and the scope for much more granular and differentiated price 
signals are already increasing. The supply from intermittent renewables, particularly solar 
PV, varies significantly in real time and is not controllable like conventional generation.  
Demand is becoming increasingly flexible and the costs of sending differentiated price 
signals are falling, for example, because of smart metering. Increases in computing power 
suggest that it is possible to more quickly resolve prices to exploit smaller time windows and 
more geographical dispersion (Greve et al., 2016).  
Despite its potential advantages, arising especially via Principles 1 and 3, nodal 
pricing is currently neither practiced in the EU nor is it encouraged by the Target Electricity 
Model (TEM). Classic results of Schweppe et al. (1988) and Hogan (1992) show that nodal 
pricing can achieve higher social welfare than less granular pricing approaches. Current EU 
short-run electricity prices are insufficiently granular to properly value flexibility, balancing 
markets within the EU are not yet coupled, and ancillary services remain poorly priced in 
most markets. Nonetheless, nodal pricing should at least be compatible with the TEM.  
The use of short-time interval locational pricing has already spread across US power 
markets, together with wider areas managed by Independent System Operators (ISOs), but 
remains underutilized across Europe. In the pioneering region of PJM (in the Eastern US), 
locational marginal prices (LMP) which reflect the marginal value of electricity at each node 
are recomputed by the System Operation (SO) every five minutes.  
Indeed, nodal pricing to reflect the locational value of renewables would complement 
a more efficient European RES support design. Given that much RES is currently paid 
independent of location, the network is inefficiently saturated in high-resource (wind or PV) 
areas. With nodal pricing, excessive location would depress local power prices and thus 
signal the need to locate subsequent renewables elsewhere. The geographic dispersion of DG 
                                                                                                                                                                            
to have private PV on their roof than households in bottom income decile. Neuhoff et al. (2013) find 
that poor households allocate twice as much of their expenditure to power and show the resulting 
distributional effects of German renewables support policies. 
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suggests increasing benefits could be realized by pricing which reflects local congestion 
constraints and line losses and avoids the need for expensive re-dispatch. 
Large-scale modelling estimates by Neuhoff et al. (2013) suggest large welfare gains 
from a shift to nodal pricing and market integration in a future high-RES world (relative to a 
market design with nationally-determined prices). These gains arise from a combination of 
better use of the network, cost savings from more efficient dispatch, and lower overall 
electricity prices. More generally, sharper supply and demand signals would also allow better 
price arbitrage between nodes and across interconnectors, and better use of storage. 
A shift to nodal pricing does carry the risk of reducing market liquidity and increasing 
market power but to the extent that more granular prices more accurately reflect the value and 
cost of power, they are valuable to the system. Markets with nodal pricing tend to have 
sophisticated in-house market monitoring functions (such as the independent market 
monitoring function associated with PJM). More generally, such a shift would require 
adaptation of market players and institutions. However, the existence of better separation of 
transmission from the rest of the electricity system than in the US and stronger national 
regulatory authorities suggests it is possible for Europe to rise to such a regulatory challenge 
(see Strbac et al., 2014). 
Moreover, the current reliance on some ancillary services markets, such as for 
frequency response, could be reduced (in line with Principle 1)—given that these markets 
exist in the first place to maintain supply in the absence of fully granular prices. Ancillary 
services markets themselves can also move from bilateral contracting to more real-time 
market-priced products. This would facilitate competition in ancillary services provision 
between conventional generators and new sources of flexibility services such as batteries and 
interconnectors. 
It is possible to mix better nodal and zonal pricing to reflect how local network 
conditions vary across MSs (Principle 2). Zonal pricing is a less granular form of pricing than 
the locational marginal price, with a single market price inside a region (typically a country 
or state). The trade-off is that nodal pricing achieves more efficient dispatch while more 
broadly configured zonal pricing gives more trading liquidity. For countries in which binding 
constraints in the transmission system are rare and nodal prices are relatively similar, zonal 
pricing may be preferable given its greater liquidity for traders. Other countries, which have 
more serious transmission constraints or are affected by large and variable transit flows, can 
pursue more fine-grained pricing (LMP) within their own networks.
30
 
The TEM aims to create price zones that reflect transmission constraints rather than 
country boundaries, but to date many countries choose not to subdivide their country into 
zones. Britain is a clear example where this should have happened at the Scottish border but 
does not; Norway, in contrast, has a reasonable number of separate price zones. Even in the 
absence of nodal pricing, transmission system charges can still be made locationally 
differentiated. Yet many EU countries still levy grid charges on consumers with no charges 
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 Markets with central dispatch seem to manage LMP, while those with self-dispatch, like most 
power exchanges, argue for the liquidity of zonal pricing (in which case transmission charging needs 
to be suitably locational). In GB, some have argued that balancing charges should be nodal, so that at 
least generators face the right prices for marginal output decisions. 
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for generation, so there is no spatial variation and thus no or very weak locational guidance 
for new investment. 
The standard US hedging instrument for volatile nodal prices is a Transmission 
Congestion Contract for a fixed number of MW. Its strike price is set at the current best 
estimate of the nodal cost of injecting power at a particular location. For renewables, the 
contracts would need to reflect output patterns and de-rated capacity. If the generator injects 
more than the contracted amount, it receives the LMP for the extra amount; if less, it pays the 
excess up to the LMP. This hedges against the varying LMP while incentivizing the generator 
to take the LMP as the relevant price for deciding how to offer output (Hadsell and Shawky, 
2009). It would also provide more certainty about future transmission charges and clearer 
locational guidance.
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5.6. Long-term contracting and risk management 
As a result of their durability, generation investments are exposed to a variety of risks. This 
includes innovation reducing the cost of competing technologies, changes to future fuel 
prices, carbon prices and also those to energy policy—such as wholesale price caps, carbon 
price floors, or RES subsidies that collapse wholesale prices. The energy sector has always 
had to deal with challenges of geopolitics but increased concern over climate change and 
sustainability has created new policy risks that are difficult to hedge. This means that equity 
investors in the energy sector are required to bear new risks, which raises the cost of 
financing the investments needed to deliver sustainability. 
These distortions have resulted in individual MSs introducing a plethora of policies. 
One is the increasing use of capacity mechanisms to support otherwise excessively risky and 
potentially commercially unattractive fossil fuel generation to be available to provide the 
system with the required firmness and flexibility. Another is the use of long-term contracts 
(or purchase contracts) to support nuclear power generation. A general problem of this 
patchwork of policies is that its complexity favours better-informed actors in the private 
sector over the governments who design them. 
Recent examples such as the planned UK nuclear plant at Hinkley Point C suggest 
that offering long-term price contracts may be high-cost solution compared to other 
alternatives, e.g. cost-sharing in the procurement with an auction-determined price to operate 
the plant once commissioned. Governments often find it difficult to determine and negotiate 
the favourable contract terms (Taylor, 2016). Excessively long contract durations (e.g. 15 
years for capacity contracts in GB) appear to reflect a lack of political faith in short-term 
energy and ancillary services markets to provide a firm basis for security of supply. 
An overarching goal of a “2nd generation market design” should be to achieve a 
simpler, better and more predictable policy environment that strengthens the ability of the 
electricity market to deliver supply security even with a high share of RES. Indeed, the 
mechanisms discussed above—more market integration, more granular price signals, more 
efficient RES support—would themselves likely reduce the reliance on politically-backed 
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connections on the need for reinforcement; this just makes explicit the calculations that need to be 
done in any case. 
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long-term contracts. While an inefficient policy casts doubt on its own durability, efficient 
policies ought to command more credibility, provided they achieve political and public 
support. 
 Higher levels of RES have revealed the “missing money” problems of the current 
market design for conventional plant need to provide reserves and flexibility services. Given 
the current extent of both “missing money” and “missing markets”, the least-cost option for 
procuring such plant as the system becomes tight is a capacity auction (following on from 
Principles 3 and 6). While reliant on government judgment of the type and amount of 
capacity to be procured, this uses competitive market forces to determine the price of such 
capacity (to be paid to generators available to provide it during stress hours). 
The European policy discussion on capacity mechanisms is still evolving. Within the 
class of capacity auctions, reliability options (Cramton and Stoft, 2008) may be preferable to 
the capacity mechanisms currently used in GB, Italy, Spain and other parts of Europe. 
Reliability options (ROs) have been recently proposed for the single market of the island of 
Ireland (Irish Republic and Northern Ireland). They specify a price cap set somewhat above 
the variable cost of the most expensive generator; RO holders pay back any excess of the 
market price above the cap, while consumers are protected by the cap. Their merit is that the 
wholesale price can still rise to high levels, signaling the efficient scarcity value for trading 
over interconnectors and activating demand response measures.
32
  
 
Efficient risk allocation for RES 
Similar to the rise in the importance of risk management for conventional generators 
following the reforms of the 1990s, RES will need to enhance its risk-management 
capabilities in a more market-based future world. 
In addition to the output risk due to fluctuations in the wind or sun, there are two 
principal kinds of risk facing RES. The first is the balancing risk that arises because output is 
still uncertain when it is contracted for sale. Renewables becoming balance-responsible 
parties would require them to predict their availability at the time of contracting (year or 
month ahead) or submitting offers into EUPHEMIA day ahead or intra-day. Over a year, 
prediction errors might roughly average out and so RES is equally likely to be short or long 
in the balancing market. If prices are higher when the market is short then RES will likely 
under-contract and spill any surpluses into the balancing market (at a slight penalty overall). 
This risk, given its predictability over time should be contractible with third parties, usually 
with a larger generating utility.
33
 
 The second risk arises in support mechanisms, such as PFiTs and the capacity 
auctions suggested above, that link revenue to the wholesale price. These are likely to be 
positively correlated with overall economic activity and fuel prices. Yet retailers face no 
greater risk buying from RES than conventional generators, so should be willing to offer 
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 DG COMP has recently expressed a preference for ROs over capacity payments as they are thought 
to create the least disturbance to trading partners, as well as considerable hostility to the holding of 
strategic reserves except to address very short-run capacity shortages (European Commission, 2016a). 
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 This is supported by the estimates of Gowrisankaran et al. (2016) that the non-perfect 
forecastability of intermittency accounts for less than 5% of the overall social costs of solar PV (in 
Arizona, USA)—while intermittency itself accounts for more than 30% (in the absence of storage). 
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similar contracts to both. Indeed, large integrated utilities already offer long-term power 
purchase agreements (PPAs), which are essentially fixed-price contracts with a risk premium. 
 The remaining risk facing RES is its own output risk. Averaged over a run of years, 
this is likely to be modest (even if daily and monthly fluctuations are large) and only weakly 
correlated with the stock market—and so does not lead to a significantly higher required 
return from equity investors. In sum, efficiently managed, the remaining risks to RES may 
well be modest—but the point is that they need to be managed. 
 In the future, RES may thus face greater transaction costs arising from such increased 
risk management in a more market-based world.
34
 The costs of trading 24-7, while 
continuously monitoring weather forecasts and optimizing positions, would be significant 
relative to the size of the average wind farm. This would benefit from aggregators taking on 
that task (Principle 5). In Spain, the system operator takes an active role in managing wind 
output; system operators would be well-placed to also help aggregate and manage risk.
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6. Concluding remarks 
Rather than rehearsing the above arguments, we conclude by offering some broader 
reflections on the future high-RES world and policy design within it. A broader implication 
of our proposal to shift RES support to being based on capacity, is that the EU’s RES targets 
themselves may also better be specified in terms of the capacity share of renewables (not 
their output share). This capacity share would have to be suitably de-rated, to ensure 
comparability across different types of RES generation—as well as a cost-efficient overall 
RES portfolio. 
While increased interconnection brings substantial benefits to the high-RES system as 
a whole, the allocation of the costs and benefits of the interconnector between the two parties 
remains a challenge. Its beneficiaries are consumers in high-price regions and producers in 
low-price regions, together with the broad benefits of greater supply security, and lower 
system cost. Ensuring that interconnector owners are remunerated for all the services they 
provide would go some way to resolve this problem, provided other tariffs are set at efficient 
levels. Reallocating the shared costs of the interconnectors in proportion to those who benefit 
might also assist with a fairer allocation of the total benefit. 
For grid-scale batteries, a major question is whether those batteries that make sense 
from a system viewpoint can find a viable business model. A battery provides multiple 
sources of value to the system (e.g., deferral of transmission and distribution upgrades, 
reserve capacity, frequency response services). This requires monetization of multiple 
revenue streams, which are currently variously regulated and market-based. Many of the 
sources of value of a grid-scale storage facility are local and subject to detailed power flow 
modeling; hence their valuation and subsequent contract design remains challenging across 
Europe. Viable business models may require a reconsideration of who can own and operate 
grid and distribution-scale batteries, given that current EU unbundling rules restrict the ability 
of network companies to own and operate such facilities. Improved network models 
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35
 See http://www.ree.es/en/press-office/infographs-and-maps/control-centre-of-renewable-energies-
%28cecre%29 
 25 
combined with real-time monitoring and the development of standard contracts offer the 
prospect of reduced transaction costs—but will likely require considerable investment and 
experimentation to realize their potential. 
Distributed generation, in combination with batteries, may pose even more difficult 
payment allocation problems. Then richer customers with batteries will be able to actually 
reduce their use of the network, making it inevitable that either poorer customers pay more or 
tariffs will need reform to require higher fixed charges and time-varying energy charges 
closer to the wholesale level. Batteries with DG will clearly expose any arbitrage 
opportunities within the existing charging methodologies for both power and network use; as 
we have argued, it is important that these reflect value differences, not incidental cross-
subsidies arising from poor tariff design. 
Future emphasis could shift to mobilizing funds at the EU level to support RD&D of 
immature but promising technologies. Some estimates suggest that the financial support of 
major EU countries to RES deployment has exceeded that to R&D by a factor of over 100 
(Zachmann et al., 2014, Figure 2) while the social returns to R&D have been estimated to be 
higher than to deployment returns (Jamasb and Koehler, 2007). This mobilization could 
perhaps be funded by MS contributions proportional to GDP or energy consumption. 
 
A radically different electricity market design? 
Over the long run, how to genuinely decentralize investment decisions around the quantity 
and type of generation to the private sector remains a key design problem for all electricity 
markets wishing to decarbonize. From 1990 to the mid 2000s, Europe successfully created a 
competitive wholesale market that privatized decision-making and risk management around 
new generation. Since then, governments have re-emerged as the major driving force behind 
the choice of the level and technology of investment.  
A radically different future design may emerge via experimentation and the evolution 
of new technologies. A genuine market in low-carbon electricity may require a degree of 
financial and ownership integration between retailers and generators that is very different 
from the today’s high degree of separation. It may also require very different contractual 
relationships between electricity consumers and retailers, which ensure the financing of long-
term investments at reasonable cost and reflect the more distributed nature of generation. The 
ability and willingness of governments to let the private sector deliver such solutions will 
vary. This suggests the emergence of wider variation in the degree of government control of 
the electricity sector than was established by the single market project in the mid-2000s. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 26 
References 
ACER (2015). Annual Report on the Results of Monitoring the Internal Electricity and 
Natural Gas Markets in 2014. November. 
Alanne, Kari and Arto Saari (2006). Distributed Energy Generation and Sustainable 
Development. Renewable and Sustainable Energy Reviews 10(6), 539-558. 
Allaz, Blaise and Jean-Luc Vila, Cournot Competition, Forward Markets and Efficiency. 
Journal of Economic Theory 59, 1-16. 
Anaya, Karim and Michael Pollitt (2016). Can Current Electricity Markets Cope with High 
Shares of Renewables? A Comparison of Approaches in Germany, the UK and the 
State of New York. The Energy Journal 37, 69-88. 
Anaya, Karim and Michael Pollitt (2015). The Role of Distribution Network Operators in  
Promoting Cost-Effective Distributed Generation: Lessons from the United States of 
America for Europe. Renewable and Sustainable Energy Reviews 51, 484-496. 
Andor, Mark, Manuel Frondel and Colin Vance (2016). Germany’s Energiewende: A Tale of 
Increasing Costs and Decreasing Willingness-To-Pay. The Energy Journal, 
forthcoming. 
Athawale, Rasika and Frank Felder (2016). Residential Rate Design and Death Spiral for 
 Electric Utilities: Efficiency and Equity Considerations. In Fereidoon P. Sioshansi 
 (ed.), Future of Utilities: Utilities of the Future, Elsevier, 193-209. 
Barbour, Edward, Grant Wilson, Jonathan Radcliffe, Yulong Ding and Yongliang Li, (2016). 
A Review of Pumped Hydro Energy Storage Development in Significant International 
Electricity Markets. Renewable and Sustainable Energy Reviews 61, 421-432. 
BDEW (2016). Erneuerbare Energien und das EEG: Zahlen, Fakten, Grafiken, 
Bundesverband der Energie- und Wasserwirtschaft, Berlin, February. 
Bigerna, Simona, Carlo Andrea Bollino and Paolo Polinori (2016). Renewable Energy and 
Market Power in the Italian Electricity Market. The Energy Journal 37, 123-144. 
Bishop, Justin, Colin Axon, David Bonilla and David Banister (2016). Estimating the Grid 
Payments Necessary to Compensate Additional Costs to Prospective Electric Vehicle 
Owners Who Provide Vehicle-to-Grid Ancillary Services. Energy 94, 715-727. 
Boffa, Federico, Viswanath Pingali and Davide Vannoni (2010). Increasing Market 
Interconnection: An Analysis of the Italian Electricity Spot Market. International 
Journal of Industrial Organization 28, 311-322. 
Böhringer, Christoph, Thomas F. Rutherford, and Richard S.J. Tol (2009). The EU 
20/20/2020 targets: An Overview of the EMF22 Assessment. Energy Economics, 31, 
S268-S273. 
Borenstein, Severin (2012). The Private and Public Economics of Renewable Electricity 
Generation, Journal of Economic Perspectives, 26(1), 67-92.  
Brunekreeft, Gert, Marius Buchmann and Roland Meyer (2016). The Rise of Third Parties 
and the Fall of Incumbents Driven by Large-Scale Integration of Renewable Energies: 
the Case of Germany. The Energy Journal 37,243-262. 
Buchan, David and Malcolm Keay (2015). Europe’s Long Energy Journey: Towards an  
Energy Union? Oxford: Oxford University Press. 
CEPA and PB (2011). Updates to the Feed-in-Tariffs Model: Documentation of Change for  
the Solar PV Consultation. Cambridge Economic Policy Associates and Parsons  
 27 
Brinckerhoff. 
Clerici, Alessandro, Bruno Cova and Gabriele Callegari (2015). Decarbonization of the 
Electrical Power Sector in Europe: An Asset, An Opportunity or a Problem? Energy 
& Environment, 26(1-2), 127-142. 
Cossent, Rafael, Tomas Gómez and Luis Olmos (2011). Large-Scale Integration of 
Renewable and Distributed Generation of Electricity in Spain: Current Situation and 
Future Needs. Energy Policy, 39(12), 8078-8087. 
Cramton, Peter and Steven Stoft (2008). Forward Reliability Markets: Less Risk, Less 
Market Power, More Efficiency. Utilities Policy 16, 194-201. 
DECC (2013). More Interconnection: Improving Energy security and Lowering Bills. 
Available at: 
https://www.gov.uk/government/uploads/system/uploads/attachment_data/file/266460
/More_interconnection_-_improving_energy_security_and_lowering_bills.pdf 
DECC (2012). Identifying Trends in the Deployment of Domestic Solar PV under the Feed-in  
Tariff Scheme. 
Denny, E. A. Tuohy, P. Meibom, A. Keane, D. Flynn, A. Mullane, M. O’Malley (2010). The 
Impact of Increased Interconnection on Electricity Systems with Large Penetrations of 
Wind Generation: A Case Study of Ireland and Great Britain. Energy Policy 38, 6946-
6954. 
Diamond, P. and J. Mirrlees (1971). Optimal Taxation and Public Production I: Production 
Efficiency. American Economic Review, 61(1), pp. 8-27. 
ECA (2015). European Electricity Forward Markets and Hedging Products: State of Play 
and Elements for Monitoring. Report prepared for ACER. Available at: 
http://www.acer.europa.eu/en/Electricity/Market%20monitoring/Documents_Public/E
CA%20Report%20on%20European%20Electricity%20Forward%20Markets.pdf 
EIA (2016). International Energy Statistics: Hydroelectric Pumped Storage Electricity 
Installed Capacity. Available at: 
http://www.eia.gov/cfapps/ipdbproject/iedindex3.cfm?tid=2&pid=82&aid=7&cid=reg
ions&syid=2004&eyid=2008&unit=MK 
European Commission (2015). Energy Union Package, COM(2015)80 final. Available at: 
http://ec.europa.eu/priorities/energy-union/docs/energyunion_en.pdf  
European Commission (2016a). Final Report of the Sector Inquiry on Capacity Mechanisms 
COM(2016)752. Available at: 
http://ec.europa.eu/energy/sites/ener/files/documents/com2016752.en_.pdf  
European Commission (2016b). EU Reference Scenario 2016 Energy, Transport and GHG  
Emissions – Trends to 2050 Main Results. Available at: 
https://ec.europa.eu/energy/sites/ener/files/documents/20160712_Summary_Ref_scen
ario_MAIN_RESULTS%20(2)-web.pdf 
European Parliament (2001). Directive 2001/77/EC of the European Parliament and of the 
Council of 27
th
 September 2001 on the promotion of electricity produced from 
renewable energy sources in the internal electricity market.  
European Parliament (2009a). Directive 2009/28/EC of the European Parliament and of the 
Council of 23 April 2009 on the promotion of the use of energy from renewable 
sources and amending and subsequently repealing Directives 2001/77/EC and 
2003/30/EC. 
 28 
European Parliament (2009b). Directive 2009/72/EC of the European Parliament and of the 
Council of 13 July 2009 concerning common rules for the internal market in 
electricity and repealing Directive 2003/54/EC (Text with EEA relevance). 
Farmer, J. Doyne and François Lafond (2016). How Predictable is Technological Progress? 
Research Policy 45, 647-665. 
Gowrisankaran, Gautam, Stanley S. Reynolds and Mario Samano (2016). Intermittency and 
the Value of Renewable Energy. Journal of Political Economy 124, 1187-1234. 
Greve, Thomas, Charalampos Patsios, Michael G. Pollitt, and Phil Taylor (2016). Economic  
Zones for Future Complex Power Systems. EPRG Working Paper 1625. 
Haas, Reinhard, Christian Panzer, Gustav Resch, Mario Ragwitz, Gemma Reece and Anne 
Held (2011). A Historical Review of Promotion Strategies for Electricity from 
Renewable Energy Sources in EU Countries. Renewable and Sustainable Energy 
Reviews, 15(2), 1003-1034. 
Hadsell, Lester and Hany A. Shawky (2009). Efficiency and Profit in the NYISO 
Transmission Congestion Contract Market. The Electricity Journal 22, 47-57. 
Hawaii Public Utilities Commission (2015). Distributed Energy Resources (Docket No. 2014- 
0192) Phase 1 Decision & Order: ‘PUC Reforms Energy Programs to Support Future 
Sustainable Growth in Hawaii Rooftop Solar Market. Available at: 
http://puc.hawaii.gov/wp-content/uploads/2015/10/DER-Phase-1-DO-Summary.pdf 
Hirth, Lion (2016). What Caused the Drop in European Electricity Prices? A Factor  
Decomposition Analysis. Working Paper at Mercator Research Institute on Global 
Commons and Climate Change (CCC), October 2016. 
Hirth, Lion, Falko Ueckerdt and Ottmar Edenhofer (2015). Integration Costs Revisited – An 
Economic Framework for Wind and Solar Variability. Renewable Energy 74, 925-
939. 
Hogan, William W. (1992). Contract Networks for Electric Power Transmission. Journal of 
Regulatory Economics 4, 211-242. 
IEA (2016). Medium-Term Renewable Energy Market Report 2016. International Energy 
Agency, October. 
ITRPV (2016). International Technology Roadmap for Photovoltaic Results, 7th Edition 
2016. Available at: http://www.itrpv.net/Reports/Downloads/2016/  
Jaffe, Adam B., Richard G. Newell and Robert N. Stavins (2005). A Tale of Two Market 
Failures: Technology and Environmental Policy. Ecological Economics 54, 164-174. 
Jamasb, Tooraj and Jonathan Koehler (2007). Learning Curves for Energy Technology: A 
Critical Assessment. In: Michael Grubb, Tooraj Jamasb and Michael G. Pollitt (eds.), 
Delivering a Low Carbon Electricity System: Technologies, Economics and Policy. 
Cambridge University Press. 
Joskow, Paul L. (2008). Capacity Payments in Imperfect Electricity Payments: Need and 
Design. Utilities Policy 16:3, 159-170. 
Kiesling, L. Lynne (2009), Deregulation, Innovation and Market Liberalization: Electricity 
Regulation in a Continually Evolving Environment. London and New York: 
Routledge. 
King, David, John Browne, Richard Layard, Gus O’Donnell, Martin Rees, Nicholas Stern, 
and Adair Turner, 2015. A Global Apollo Programme to Combat Climate Change. 
 29 
Available at: 
http://cep.lse.ac.uk/pubs/download/special/Global_Apollo_Programme_Report.pdf  
Li, Li Wen, Janine Birmele, Harold Schaich and Werner Konold (2013). Transitioning to 
Community-Owned Renewable Energy: Lessons from Germany. Procedia 
Environmental Sciences 17, 719-728. 
NAO (2016). Controlling The Consumer-Funded Costs of Energy Policies: The Levy Control  
Framework. HC 725 SESSION 2016-17 18 OCTOBER 2016, London: National 
Audit Office. 
Neuhoff, Karsten, Steffen Bach, Jochen Dieckmann, Martin Beznoska and Tarik El-Laboudy 
(2013). Distributional Effects of Energy Transition: Impacts of Renewable Electricity 
Support in Germany. Economics of Energy & Environmental Policy 2, 41-54. 
Neuhoff, Karsten, Julian Barquin, Janusz W. Bialek, Rodney Boyd, Chris J. Dent, Francisco 
Echavarren, Thilo Grau, Christian von Hirschhausen, Benjamin F. Hobbs, Friedrich 
Kunz, Christian Nabe, Georgios Papaefthymoiu, Christoph Weber and Hannes Weigt 
(2013). Renewable Electric Energy Integration: Quantifying the Value of Design of 
Markets for International Transmission Capacity. Energy Economics 40, 760-772. 
Newbery, David (1995). Power Markets and Market Power. The Energy Journal 16:3, 39-66. 
Newbery, David (2016a). Towards a Green Energy Economy? The EU Energy Union's 
Transition to a Low-Carbon Zero Subsidy Electricity System – Lessons from the UK's 
Electricity Market Reform, Applied Energy 179, 1321-1330. 
Newbery, David (2016b). Tales of Two Islands - Lessons for EU Energy Policy from 
Electricity Market Reforms in Britain and Ireland, Energy Policy, forthcoming. 
Newbery, David (2016c). A Simple Introduction to the Economics of Storage: Shifting 
Demand and Supply over Time and Space. EPRG Working Paper 1626. 
Newbery, David and Goran Strbac (2016). What is Needed for Battery Electric Vehicles to 
Become Socially Cost Competitive? Economics of Transportation 5, 1–11. 
Newbery, David, Goran Strbac and Ivan Viehoff (2016). The Benefits of Integrating 
European Electricity Markets, Energy Policy 94, 253–263. 
Nordhaus, William D. (2014). The Perils of the Learning Model for Modeling Endogenous 
Technological Change. The Energy Journal, 35(1): 1-13. 
Parsons, George R., Michael K. Hidrue, Willett Kempton and Meryl P. Gardner (2014). 
Willingness to Pay for Vehicle-to-Grid (V2G) Electric Vehicles and Their Contract 
Terms. Energy Economics 42, 313-324. 
O’Sullivan, Jon, Alan Rogers, Damian Flynn, Paul Smith, Alan Mullane and Mark O’Malley  
(2014). Studying the Maximum Instantaneous Non-Synchronous Generation in an 
Island System–Frequency Stability Challenges in Ireland. IEEE Transactions on 
Power Systems 29, 2943-2951. 
Pepermans, Guido, Johan Driesen, Dries Haeseldonckx, Ronnie Belmans and William  
D’haeseleer (2005). Distributed Generation: Definition, Benefits and Issues. Energy 
Policy 33(6), 787-798. 
Pollitt, Michael, Strielkowski, Wadim (2016). Consumer Solar Distributed Generation (DG): 
Net Metering and Some Competition Issues. Public comment outline for Federal 
Trade Commission (FTC) investigation. Available at: 
https://www.ftc.gov/system/files/documents/public_comments/2016/08/00200-
128740.pdf    
 30 
Pollitt, Michael G. (2016). Electricity Network Charging for Flexibility. EPRG Working 
Paper 1623. 
Pollitt, Michael G. (2017). The Economic Consequences of Brexit: Energy. Oxford Review of  
Economic Policy, forthcoming. 
Praktiknjo, Aaron and Georg Erdmann (2016). Renewable Electricity and Backup Capacities: 
An (Un-) Resolvable Problem? The Energy Journal 37, 89-106. 
Pudjianto, Danny, Marko Aunedi, Predrag Djapic, and Goran Strbac, 2014. Whole-Systems 
Assessment of the Value of Energy Storage in Low-Carbon Electricity Systems. IEEE 
Transactions on Smart Grid 5(2), 1098-1109. 
Ritz, Robert A. (2016). How Does Renewables Competition Affect Forward Contracting in 
Electricity Markets? Economics Letters 146, 135-139. 
Rubin, Edward S., Ines M.L. Azevedo, Paulina Jaramilloa and Sonia Yeh, (2015). A Review 
of Learning Rates for Electricity Supply Technologies. Energy Policy 86, 198-218. 
Ruggiero, Salvatore, Vilja Varho and Pasi Rikkonen (2015). Transition to Distributed Energy 
Generation in Finland: Prospects and Barriers. Energy Policy 86, 433-443. 
Ruz, F.C. and Pollitt, Michael (2016). Overcoming Barriers to Electrical Energy Storage:  
Comparing California and Europe. Competition and Regulation in Network Industries 
17 (2), 123-150. 
Sandmo, Agnar (1975). Optimal Taxation in the Presence of Externalities. Swedish Journal  
of Economics 77, 86-98 
Schweppe, Fred C., Michael C. Caramanis, Richard D. Tabors, and Roger E. Bohn (1988). 
Spot Pricing of Electricity. Springer. 
Shah, Rakibuzzaman, Nadarajah Mithulananathan, Ramesh Bansal, Kwang Y. Lee and 
Abraham Lomi (2012). Influence of Large-Scale PV on Voltage Stability of Sub-
transmission System. International Journal on Electrical Engineering and 
Informatics 4(1), 148-61. 
Sidhu, Arjan, Michael Pollitt and Karim Anaya (2017). A Social Cost Benefit Analysis of  
 Grid-Scale Electrical Energy Storage Projects: Evaluating the Smarter Network 
Storage Project, EPRG Working Paper, forthcoming. 
Simshauser, P. (2016). Distribution Network Prices and Solar PV: Resolving Rate Instability 
and Wealth Transfers Through Demand Tariffs. Energy Economics 54, 108-122. 
Spiecker, Stephan, Philip Vogel and Christoph Weber (2013). Evaluating Interconnector 
Investments in the North European Electricity System Considering Fluctuating Wind 
Power Generation. Energy Economics 40, 114-127. 
Staffell, Iain and Mazda Rustomji (2016). Maximising the Value of Electricity Storage. 
Journal of Energy Storage, forthcoming.  
Steinhilber, Simone (2016). Onshore Wind Concession Auctions in China: Instruments and 
Lessons Learnt. AURES Report D4.1-CN, March. 
Stoft, Steven (2002). Power System Economics: Designing Markets for Electricity. IEEE 
Press, Wiley Interscience, Piscataway NJ, USA. Strbac, Goran, Michael Pollitt, 
Christos Vasilakos Konstantinidis, Ioannis Konstantelos, Rodrigo Moreno, David 
Newbery and Richard Green (2014). Electricity Transmission Arrangements in Great 
Britain: Time for Change? Energy Policy 73, 298-311. 
 31 
Taylor, Simon (2016). The Fall and Rise of Nuclear Power in Britain: A History. UIT 
Cambridge. 
Winkler, Jenny, Alberto Gaio, Benjamin Pfluger and Mario Ragwitz (2016). Impact of 
Renewables on Electricity Markets – Do Support Schemes Matter? Energy Policy 93, 
157-167. 
Würzburg, Klaas, Xavier Labandeira and Pedro Linares (2013). Renewable Generation and 
Electricity Prices: Taking Stock and New Evidence for Germany and Austria. Energy 
Economics 40, S159-S171.  
Zachmann, Georg, Amma Serwaah and Michele Peruzzi (2014). When and How to Support 
Renewables? Letting the Data Speak. Bruegel Working Paper 2014/01. 
